
fdic.gov · Original source page
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Original assetThe signal
Silicon Valley Bank, a mid-sized U.S. lender concentrated in the technology and venture-capital sector, was closed by California's Department of Financial Protection and Innovation on 10 March 2023, with the FDIC named receiver. This is a finance-sector event about bank supervision and deposit behaviour. The FDIC's own closure notice records the bank held 'approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits' as of 31 December 2022, with uninsured deposits 'undetermined' at closure. The Federal Reserve's own review, published 28 April 2023, puts a number on the run's speed: about $42 billion was withdrawn or requested on 9 March and a further $100 billion was requested on 10 March, before regulators intervened.
The evidence
The Fed's review is a self-examination by the bank's own primary federal supervisor, which strengthens its candour about supervisory failure but means it should be read as an interested party's account, not a fully independent audit. It attributes the failure to interest-rate risk built up as the Fed raised its policy rate from near zero to roughly 4.25-4.50% between 2021 and 2023, leaving the bank with close to $91.5 billion in unrealised securities losses at year-end 2022, and to supervisory guidance the review says should have prompted earlier action. A second, dated source, the Fed's own press release of 12 March 2023, documents the emergency response: additional funding for eligible institutions, a systemic-risk exception for Signature Bank, and a statement that 'no losses... will be borne by the taxpayer'. Together the two documents separate the mechanism, concentrated uninsured deposits plus rate risk, from the trigger: a weekend run conducted by phone rather than in branches.
Timeframe and confidence
Confidence in the closure date, asset figures and withdrawal amounts is high, because each comes from a dated official document. Confidence in any broader claim that digital banking makes all deposit runs this fast is lower: this is one institution with an unusually concentrated, uninsured depositor base that communicated quickly, and the review frames its finding as specific to this bank. That broader claim is an editorial extension the two documents do not themselves make.
What would change the reading
A comparable outflow figure from a bank with a typical, insured retail depositor base would show whether the speed problem is general to mobile banking or specific to concentrated, uninsured deposits. Later Fed or FDIC data on concentration limits or liquidity rules adopted because of this episode would show whether the finding changed practice.
- What share of a bank's deposits are insured, and how concentrated are they by sector or account size?
- How quickly can a bank convert held-to-maturity securities to cash without the loss that constrained Silicon Valley Bank?
- Did supervisors flag similar interest-rate exposure elsewhere before it became a finding only after a failure?
The documented facts here are a closure date, a balance-sheet snapshot, and a two-day withdrawal figure. The link from those facts to 'mobile banking makes every bank fragile' is an editorial reading the source material does not itself make.
Source trail
- FDIC Press Release: FDIC Creates a Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clarawww.fdic.gov · Source publication: 2023-03-10 · Retrieved 2026-09-16
States the closure date, receivership, and the bank's total assets and deposits as of 31 December 2022.
- Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bankwww.federalreserve.gov · Source publication: 2023-04-28 · Retrieved 2026-09-16
Gives the $42 billion and $100 billion outflow figures, the $91.5 billion unrealised-loss figure, and the supervisory-failure finding.
- Federal Reserve Board announces it will make available additional funding to eligible depository institutionswww.federalreserve.gov · Source publication: 2023-03-12 · Retrieved 2026-09-16
Documents the emergency funding response and the taxpayer-loss statement.
- Event date
- 2023-03-10
- First source date
- 2023-03-10
- Source-record publication
- Not supplied — draft retained
- Preparation
- 2026-09-16